Written by Michael J Weiler

Pepin v Telecommunications Workers Union 2016 BCSC 790

I always find it interesting to read cases where the employer is a union. There is somehow an irony in seeing a union qua employer taking a hard-nosed stand against its employees who may be represented by a union. In a recent court case where the Telecommunications Workers Union was the employer/defendant the result was quite unusual and opens up potentially a whole new area of punitive damages.Diane Pepin was employed by the TWU as a communication specialist. An issue arose as to whether she was included in the COPE bargaining unit. Two years after she was hired the TWU successfully argued before the Labour Relations Board that she should be excluded. Her contract contemplated that the parties would then negotiate certain terms. The parties negotiated for quite some time. The TWU refused to negotiate through Ms. Pepin’s lawyer. Negotiations finally broke down and Ms. Pepin resigned. She sued for damages including a number of items she claimed she was not properly compensated for. She initially claimed constructive dismissal but abandoned that claim. Finally she claimed punitive damages for the bad faith manner in which the TWU treated her in negotiating the terms of the contract two years after she was hired following the LRB decision confirming she was excluded from the COPE bargaining unit and collective agreement.The case comments on two areas of particular importance to employers. First there is a good discussion of the principles a court will follow in interpreting an employment contract. Secondly it extends the duty of honesty and good faith to the negotiation of the contract and awarded punitive damages to Ms. Pepin (which by the way are tax-free).

1. Contract Interpretation

The court provided a very succinct statement of the current law in interpreting contracts as it relates specifically to employment agreements. While the quote below is a bit lengthy, it is such an important subject that it is worth quoting in full:[65] As the issue between the parties concerns the interpretation of the plaintiff’s contract, it is first necessary to discuss the approach the court should take when interpreting contractual language. In Miller v. Convergys CMG Canada Limited Partnership, 2014 BCCA 311, leave to appeal referenced [2014] SCCA No. 424, Madam Justice Neilson reviewed the law at para. 15:[15] The court should strive to give effect to what the parties reasonably intended to agree to when the contract was made. The starting point is the language of the contract, which should be given its plain and literal meaning, and be interpreted in the context of the entire agreement. Consideration may also be given to the factual matrix surrounding the creation of the contract. If the contractual language reveals two possible interpretations, the court should seek to resolve this ambiguity by searching for an interpretation that reflects the true intent and reasonable expectations of the parties when they entered the contract and achieves a result consistent with commercial efficacy and good sense. Considerations of reasonableness and fairness inform this exercise. If these principles do not resolve the ambiguity, extrinsic evidence may be admissible to assist in ascertaining the parties’ intent. As a last resort the principle of contra proferentem may be invoked to favour the construction of the ambiguity against the party that drew the agreement. This principle may not be used, however, to create or magnify an ambiguity. As to employment contracts, in particular, these will be interpreted in a manner that favours employment law principles, specifically the protection of vulnerable employees in their dealings with their employers. Nevertheless, the construction of an employment contract remains an exercise in contractual interpretation, and the intentions of the parties will generally prevail, even if this detracts from employment law goals that are otherwise presumed to apply: Geoff R. Hall, Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law, 2d ed (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2012) at 9-52, 66-70, 187-88.[66] In Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Justice Rothstein elaborated on the approach to contract interpretation at paras. 47-50. He noted that the overriding concern of the decision-maker was to determine the intent of the parties and the scope of their understanding adopting a “practical, common-sense approach not dominated by technical rules of construction” and that ascertaining contractual intention from the words alone can be difficult because “words alone do not have an immutable or absolute meaning” absent a consideration of the surrounding circumstance (at para. 47). He quoted Lord Wilberforce from Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Hansen-Tangen, [1976] 3 All E.R. 570 at 574 (H.L.), at para. 47:No contracts are made in a vacuum: there is always a setting in which they have to be placed. … In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and this, in turn, presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating.[67] Justice Rothstein at para. 48 said:[48] The meaning of words is often derived from a number of contextual factors, including the purpose of the agreement and the nature of the relationship created by the agreement (see Moore Realty Inc. v. Manitoba Motor League, 2003 MBCA 71, 173 Man. R. (2d) 300, at para. 15, per Hamilton J.A.; see also Hall, at p. 22; and McCamus, at pp. 749-50). As stated by Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building Society, [1998] 1 All E.R. 98 (H.L.):The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. [p. 115][68] He went on to state that the goal of contractual interpretation is to ascertain the objective intent of the parties by considering the words of the contract in light of the factual matrix surrounding them at the time the contract was made (at para. 49).[69] As to the role of the facts surrounding the making of the contract the Court said at paras. 56-58:[56] I now turn to the role of the surrounding circumstances in contractual interpretation and the nature of the evidence that can be considered. The discussion here is limited to the common law approach to contractual interpretation; it does not seek to apply to or alter the law of contractual interpretation governed by the Civil Code of Québec.[57] While the surrounding circumstances will be considered in interpreting the terms of a contract, they must never be allowed to overwhelm the words of that agreement (Hayes Forest Services, at para. 14; and Hall, at p. 30). The goal of examining such evidence is to deepen a decision-maker’s understanding of the mutual and objective intentions of the parties as expressed in the words of the contract. The interpretation of a written contractual provision must always be grounded in the text and read in light of the entire contract (Hall, at pp. 15 and 30-32). While the surrounding circumstances are relied upon in the interpretive process, courts cannot use them to deviate from the text such that the court effectively creates a new agreement (Glaswegian Enterprises Inc. v. B.C. Tel Mobility Cellular Inc. (1997), 101 B.C.A.C. 62).[58] The nature of the evidence that can be relied upon under the rubric of “surrounding circumstances” will necessarily vary from case to case. It does, however, have its limits. It should consist only of objective evidence of the background facts at the time of the execution of the contract (King, at paras. 66 and 70), that is, knowledge that was or reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before the date of contracting. Subject to these requirements and the parole evidence rule discussed below, this includes, in the words of Lord Hoffmann, “absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man” (Investors Compensation Scheme, at p. 114). Whether something was or reasonably ought to have been within the common knowledge of the parties at the time of execution of the contract is a question of fact.[Emphasis added]The court then applied those principles and the rule of contra preferentum and found largely in favour of Ms. Pepin, although finding she was estopped from claiming overtime.

2. Punitive Damages

The court rejected Ms. Pepin’s claim for punitive damages based on breaches of the Employment Standards Act. However the court found that TWU’s conduct during negotiations including the hardball tactics and raising baseless performance issues deserved an award of punitive damages. The court stated:[112] As stated, the TWU executive may have felt the plaintiff was not performing her job duties as they had expected and they were paying her too much. Her job performance issues were not addressed with her at any time during her employment other than during the negotiations she initiated. In my view they were addressed at that time to pressure her into abandoning her contractual rights. I am also of the view the TWU’s ‘take it or leave it’ demand that she defer any wage increase to 2016 was strategically chosen to frustrate the Contract and the plaintiff. I find her responses were not “insubordinate”: rather they were made out of her frustration at being rebuffed and an employer’s offer that was far from the initial Contract she entered into. In my view TWU’s conduct of negotiations with the plaintiff was characterized by delay, by a lack of good faith and with little sensitivity for her and warrants an award of punitive damages. In essence, the plaintiff had been constructively dismissed and was justified in resigning her employment under the circumstances.[113] The TWU was put on notice in Ms.Pepin’s letter of February 20, 2013 the plaintiff’s health was being adversely affected by its refusal to honour its contractual obligations and that she was seeking professional help for stress and anxiety.[114] I award the plaintiff $25,000 as punitive damages for the unduly insensitive treatment she was subject to during her attempts to exercise her rights to renegotiate the Contract.The law in respect of an employer’s obligation to act honestly and in good faith not just at the time of termination but during the employment is developing rapidly in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71. Although the Bhasin decision was not relied on by the court in awarding punitive damages it reflects the views of the courts to protect employees who are vulnerable and subject to stress and anxiety and unfair treatment during their employment and at termination. I suspect this area of the law will expand and there will be more and more cases where such damages are awarded. Stay tuned!

Written by Michael J Weiler

Fair v Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board 2016 ONCA 421

There are a number of statutes that give various boards the authority to order reinstatement of an employee. For example, the Labour Relations Board, arbitrators under a collective agreement, the Canada Industrial Relations Board, an adjudicator under the Unjust Dismissal provisions of the Canada Labour Code, the Director of Employment Standards and the Workers Compensation Board can all order reinstatement as a remedy for a violation of their statutes or agreements. Not surprisingly the BC Human Rights Tribunal can order reinstatement of an employee although that specific remedy is not spelled out in the statute. The Tribunal derives its authority from the broad remedial powers under section 37(2)(d)(i) of the Code: see for example J.J. v. School District No. 43 (No. 5), and Kalyn v Vancouver Island Health Authority (No. 3).Reinstatement is only rarely claimed as a remedy and even more rarely is it ordered. In Parent v. St. James Community Services Society, 2008 BCHRT 182, the Tribunal noted reinstatement is not a remedy commonly sought (para. 28):… At the same time, as reinstatement in employment is not a remedy commonly sought, nor often ordered, complete submissions and information on the appropriateness of the order are to be preferred ….But when a Complainant is successful the consequence can be devastating for the employer.In Fair v Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board 2016 ONCA 421 the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the human rights Tribunal in ordering that the Complainant be reinstated with back wages. The termination had taken place some 15 years earlier reflecting the snail pace in which these types of cases take to get final adjudication (assuming no successful appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada).Ms. Fair was terminated in 2004 after her LTD had run out. Following amendments to the Ontario Human Rights Code she transferred her case to the Tribunal and in 2009 requested reinstatement as a remedy for the first time. The Tribunal found that the employer had failed to accommodate Ms. Fair by failing to consider other appropriate positions available in the workplace. She was awarded 9 years back pay, and $30,000 for compensation for the injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect. The employer was also ordered to reinstate her as soon as reasonably possible to a suitable, equivalent position for which she had the basic general qualifications and that she was to receive up to 6 months of training.Like the BC Code, the Ontario Code does not contain explicit reference to reinstatement as a remedy. The Court confirmed that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to order reinstatement and upheld the Tribunal’s decision to order it in this case. It stated:[92] As the Divisional Court correctly noted, “The Code provides the Tribunal with broad remedial authority to do what is necessary to ensure compliance with the Code.”[93] The determination of remedy falls within the specialized expertise of the Tribunal, and as such is accorded a high degree of deference: Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2010 ONSC 3884 (CanLII), 325 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (Div. Ct.), at para. 42, aff’d 2012 ONCA 155 (CanLII), 347 D.L.R. (4th) 616.[94] Further, Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2001), 2001 CanLII 21234 (ON CA), 209 D.L.R. (4th) 465, where this court set aside the reinstatement of an employee, is distinguishable from the present case. Although in Ford Motor, this court pointed to the time that had passed since the employee’s dismissal, it also relied on the internal inconsistencies within the Board’s decision and the lack of consideration of an arbitrator’s prior decision upholding the discharge: see paras. 68-73.[95] The passage of years is not, by itself, determinative of whether reinstatement is an appropriate remedy. Rather, the decision as to whether to order reinstatement is context-dependent. In the present case, the Tribunal found none of the barriers to reinstatement that foreclosed reinstatement in the Ford Motor case. Specifically, Ms. Fair’s employment relationship with the School Board was not fractured and the passage of time had not materially affected her capabilities.[96] Moreover, the Divisional Court’s reference to the labour relations context was not unreasonable or unusual. For example, the Tribunal in Krieger v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2010 HRTO 1361 (CanLII), espoused similar principles. This case involved an application by a terminated employee for reinstatement following alleged discrimination. In examining the issue of reinstatement, the Tribunal noted, at para. 182:While reinstatement orders are rarely requested or ordered in human rights cases, they are “normally” ordered in arbitral cases where a violation of a grievor’s rights has been found, unless there are “concerns that the employment relationship is no longer viable” A.U.P.E. v. Lethbridge Community College, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 727, 2004 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) (CanLII), at para. 56. The goal of human rights legislation, which is remedial in nature, is to put the applicant in the position that he or she would have been in had the discrimination not taken place. See Impact Interiors Inc. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/477 (Ont. C.A.). Where viable, reinstatement is sometimes the only remedy that can give effect to this principle.[97] Finally, there was no error in the Tribunal’s requiring the School Board to determine the appropriate position. The School Board remains in the best position to determine what positions are available or could be made available, and the adjustments that it will be required to make in order to accommodate Ms. Fair.What does this mean for B.C. employers? Will the remedy of reinstatement continue to be rarely requested and rarely ordered? Each case will be determined on its own facts so it is hard to say whether this Ontario decision will prompt more employees to seek this remedy in the non-union sector (ironically if there is a human rights violation under a collective agreement reinstatement would be the normal remedy imposed by an arbitrator). In many cases the delay in adjudicating the complaint often leads to the complainant finding new employment so reinstatement, even if sought initially, is not practical by the time the hearing is completed. But given the increased economic woes facing Alberta and on the horizon for B.C. I suspect this case will prompt more complainants’ lawyers to push for reinstatement as the appropriate remedy. The cost of settlement without reinstatement will then go up.

Written by Michael J Weiler

Cabott v Urban Systems 2016 YKCA 4 BCCA (Yukon)

The essence of a wrongful dismissal action is the fact that the employer has terminated the employee without cause and without reasonable working notice. In the absence of a written enforceable agreement the court must decide what is reasonable notice. There are many myths around the rules. For example many (including some lawyers) believe that there is a legal formula for determining reasonable notice of one month for each year of service- that is simply not correct.A court will look at 4 key factors to determine the period of notice: age, length of service, position, and the availability of similar alternate employment. It may, as well, take into account other factors such as inducement or tough economic conditions to extend the notice period (but such cannot be given “undue weight”).Employers are often shocked to find that in the case of short service employees, a longer period of notice applies. For example:(Case name, citation, position, age, length of service, notice period awarded by court)Pakozdi 2016 BCSC 992, bidder/estimator, 55 yrs. old, 13 mos. → 8 monthsSaliken 2016 BCSC 832, mechanic, 54 yrs. old, 6 mos. → 6 monthsKong 2015 BCSC 2015, senior pastor, unknown age, 34 mos. → 12 monthsRamsay 2014 BCSC 1292, CAO, 66 yrs. old, 3 mos. → 6 monthsHaftbaradaran 2011 BCSC 1424, winemaker, 38 yrs. old, 2 yrs. → 8 monthsMackie 2009 BCSC 1775, technician, 48 yrs. old, 2 yrs. → 9 monthsThe Court of Appeal considered whether there was a minimum notice period of 6 months, but rejected that proposition:Saalfeld 2009 BCCA 18, Territory Manager Software Sales (but not managerial or supervisory), $60,000 + bonus, 35 yrs old, 9 mos. service → 5 months noticeIn Cabott v Urban Systems 2016 YKCA 4, the BC Court of Appeal, sitting as the court of appeal of the Yukon, considered once again the issue of what is the appropriate notice period for a short term employee. The plaintiff was 53 years old at the time of trial and was employed by a company that provided planning services in the areas of water, transportation and communities with offices in Whitehorse and Vancouver. The plaintiff had been employed in Whitehorse for 13 months when she was terminated by the employer. She had hoped to advance within the company and be able to transfer and retire in Vancouver. The trial judge awarded her damages based on 6 months’ notice. The trial judge held:However, when one considers also the plaintiff’s age of 53 years, the latter part of her career, the specialized professional skills, the expectation of secure employment and possible eventual transition of work and retirement to Vancouver, together with her role of senior and supervisory management in Whitehorse, I conclude an appropriate period of notice, in this case, is six months.The Court of Appeal disagreed. It held that in applying the 4 factors noted above:The application of these factors is not linear and is highly dependent on circumstances. In the context of short term employment, the ratio of the length of notice to the length of service is higher than it usually is in medium or long service situations, but at a reducing rate. There are, therefore, no formulas for determining the length of reasonable notice.The appeal court held that the trial judge erred in taking into account the plaintiff’s unilateral expectation that she could ultimately return to Vancouver and awarded four months’ notice in place of six months’ notice. The Court of Appeal stated:[20] In my view, the judge erred in referring to an “expectation of … possible eventual transition … to Vancouver”. The evidence does not support a finding of a mutual expectation, or even a realistic possibility, of a move; it goes no further than describing Ms. Cabott’s desire to transfer to British Columbia, demonstrating her openness to such a possibility. To state it another way, there is no evidence that Ms. Cabott’s aspiration was consistent with the employer’s purpose in offering her employment, which was to advance its Whitehorse office by developing business in the Yukon and Northwest Territories. On the evidence, Ms. Cabott’s employment was geographically specific. Her hope of using the position to return to the Lower Mainland of British Columbia was in the realm of speculation.[21] This is an action in contract. That means that a unilateral life plan is outside the contract unless and until expressed in, or in some fashion brought within the employment relationship. It is possible that a promise of a move may have compensable value to an employee, for example when a promise induced the employee to leave a secure position. On its own, however, a unilateral life plan that is not reflected in the employment contract does not extend the parties’ rights or obligations.[22] I consider the judge erred in putting weight on the appellant’s desire to use this employment as a springboard to return to British Columbia. That being so, in my view the damage award wrongly compensates for a factor that does not admit of compensation.[23] For a short term employee the useful starting place in discussing range is the two to three months spoken of in Saalfeld and Hall. The only feature of this case that would extend that range (there being no special circumstances such as inducement, bad faith or a poor labour market) is a level of responsibility not present in those cases.It is curious to me why an appellate court would so micromanage a notice period even if the trial judge may have considered factors that were not reasonable. What if the judge had found 8 months was reasonable-would the court have reduced it to 6 months? How did it find that the trial judge awarded 2 months for this irrelevant factor? Nevertheless this decision simply demonstrates the vagaries of a litigated notice period.What should we take away from this case? Unfortunately there will still be a lot of guesswork in deciding what reasonable notice may be in any given case. Are the cases noted above no longer applicable? It is really difficult to say.In my view the best takeaway is what we have preached for many years. Employers should create certainty for both the employer and employee and eliminate the need for battling lawyers at the termination of an employment by having a written, enforceable, clear agreement on the rights of the employee upon termination without cause.

Written by Michael J WeilerFirst posted in April 2015, re-posted June 2016Sometimes you have to think outside the box. When I first began practicing labour law one of my clients had a very unique situation. They were in the business of placing glass on the outside of a new, very tall office building. The unionized installers had to install the glass skin on the outside of the building and as they worked from scaffolding they were secured by a 3 strand safety rope. There had been some turmoil in the workplace and one day, much to my client’s horror, they discovered that on certain safety ropes 2 of the 3 strands had been cut. The job was immediately shut down. Everyone had strong suspicions who had done it but there was no direct proof. How to get the crew back but ensure whoever sabotaged the worksite did not come back? Thinking outside the box we required everyone to take a polygraph (lie-detector) test. All but one person took and passed the test; the company terminated the one employee and invited the crew back.Not surprisingly the union grieved the termination. It argued lie detector tests were inherently unreliable; the employee had a right to privacy. Therefore his refusal to take the test could not have supported his termination from the job site. They claimed it was an unreasonable condition for the return to work. I argued the arbitrator should focus on 3 things important in the case—safety, safety and safety. The arbitrator found that polygraph evidence was unreliable and upheld the grievance. We lost the battle but not the war. That individual did not return to the workplace.Fast forward to today. One of the hot topics is drug and alcohol testing in the workplace especially in safety-sensitive operations. Employers took a big hit in their quest to have such testing when the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the employer’s random alcohol testing. While the case dealt with a unionized workplace and the review of an arbitrator’s decision prohibiting the testing, the decision reflects the court’s balancing of interests:Privacy and safety are highly sensitive and significant workplace interests. They are also occasionally in conflict. This is particularly the case when the workplace is a dangerous one: Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd. 2013 SCC 34 (para. 1)One of the key problems employers face in establishing the legitimacy of such random testing is the reliability of such tests is proving not just that drugs or alcohol are in the system but also that the employee is impaired. While alcohol testing is generally considered reliable in assessing current impairment, drug testing is generally not. Despite advances in drug testing (e.g. the swab test) there is still a great deal of uncertainty in connecting the results of a positive drug test to actual impairment at the workplace. And there are other practical difficulties in such testing e.g. the samples needed to take time to test so the results are often delayed.A number of years ago Gabe Somjen, head of Borden Ladner Gervais’ labour and employment group in Vancouver, presented a paper on impairment testing. He suggested replacing or at least augmenting drug and alcohol testing with impairment testing as impairment is what employers, employees and unions should be concerned about. But in order to have such successful testing employees need to feel secure in taking tests and being honest as to their condition. Impairment is not just related to abuse of alcohol or drugs—it is caused by many factors—sleep apnea; caring for a newborn during the night; etc.In the Spring of 2015, Gabe presented another session on the need for impairment testing, for the BC Business Council, and I was privileged to attend. He was joined this time by Dr. Ray Baker, a leading specialist in this field. Together they made a compelling argument that employers, employees and unions should take a different look at substance abuse in the workplace by first focusing on impairment and then moving to more appropriate testing for drugs and alcohol. The argument is, it is better to treat substance abuse by having employees and unions buy into a program that identifies the impairment.Gabe and Dr. Baker have kindly consented to me publishing their presentations on my blog. I attach to this article with permission of Gabe and Dr. Baker their slide presentations which I am confident you will find of interest. The tragedy of the Lufthansa plane crash caused many common folk and academics to think of situations where privacy rights may need to take a back seat to safety, and sadly, heightened the awareness of the problem and the need to consider alternate preventative measures.Gabe Somjen: Drug & Alcohol Testing in the Workplace: Is Impairment Testing an Alternative? Dr. Ken Baker: Reducing Workplace Impairment Michael J WeilerApril 20th, 2015; June 28th, 2016

Written by Michael J Weiler

B.C. COURT OF APPEAL RESTORES $75,000 AWARD FOR INJURY TO DIGNITY – UBC v Kelly 2016 BCCA 271

The B.C. Human Rights Tribunal has statutory authority to award a complainant an amount “to compensate that person for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect or to any of them”.In the August 31st, 2014 edition of the Weiler Law Blog we reported on a case involving a doctor who successfully won his complaint against UBC. He was awarded 6 years back pay amounting to $385,194.70 as compensation for lost wages, as well as an award for expenses, a tax gross-up and pre and post-judgment interest. Most importantly in a groundbreaking decision the Tribunal also awarded him $75,000 for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. This was more than double the previous highest award. B.C. HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL DOUBLES CAP FOR DAMAGES FOR HURT FEELINGS TO $75,000In our November 2nd, 2015 blog update we reported on the judicial review decision of Mr. Justice Silverman. The court upheld the finding of liability and also the large damage award. However it struck down the $75,000 award. HUMAN RIGHTS UPDATE—SOME GOOD NEWS FOR EMPLOYERS….MAYBE Not surprisingly UBC appealed and Dr. Kelly cross-appealed the reduction of the $75,000 award.On June 24th 2016 the BC Court of Appeal issued its decision. It dismissed UBC’s appeal on the merits and upheld the Tribunal’s decision that there had been discrimination and that UBC had not accommodated Dr. Kelly to the point of undue hardship. It dismissed the appeal on the large wage loss award. However it allowed the cross-appeal and restored the Tribunal’s award of $75,000 for damages to injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.The decision is definitely not good news for employers. Mr. Justice Ian Donald writing for the court dismissed all of UBC’s arguments on why the decision on liability was wrong. It upheld for example the Tribunal’s “holistic approach” in considering both the accommodation process (i.e. the procedural aspects) as well as the reasons for dismissal (i.e. the substantive aspects). The court held this holistic approach did not offend the law that “there is no free-standing procedural duty”. Further the lost wages award was based on the calculation of damages resulting from “delayed entry” into the program. Although this was a case of first impression it was nevertheless within the Tribunal’s discretion and was justified because of the clear causal link between the discrimination and the delayed entry.But the biggest concern for employers is the court’s acceptance that the Tribunal was entitled to find that $75,000 was justified. The court pointed out that judicial review is “not to be treated as though it were a quantum award in a personal injury case.” Ranges of awards established in previous decisions of the Tribunal “play a more diminished role in the Tribunal’s determination of an award for injury to dignity.”What is troubling in my view with the Tribunal’s decision and the court’s decision on this point is that there is very little analysis of how the 3 separate items are to be interpreted and applied. And is the court saying that this case was so unique that the award is justified but in most cases this award would be excessive?In my August 31st, 2014 blog reviewing the Tribunal’s original decision I suggested that given the courts’ reluctance to interfere with Tribunal decisions it would be unlikely the decision would be overturned. While I was wrong with respect to the BC Supreme Court the ultimate decision of the Tribunal has been upheld on all aspects. I also commented on the lack of certainty created by this decision and the negative effect that will have on employers. Absent a legislative amendment to the Code placing a cap on these damages that uncertainty is even more troublesome having the Court of Appeal’s stamp of approval.

Written by Michal J Weiler

Suncor Energy Inc. v Unifor Local 707A 2016 ABQB 269

In 2013 in the Irving Pulp & Paper the Supreme Court of Canada decided the rules on drug and alcohol testing. With the legalization of marijuana in Canada on the Liberal’s agenda there has been greater interest in this topic. While the Irving decision set the guidelines the courts and other adjudicators have grappled with the thorny question of applying that decision to the real world.A recent Alberta Court of Queen’s bench decision adds to the dialogue in this important area. Christin Elawny and Jenna Kirk of Field Law, to which firm we refer our Alberta clients, have drawn our attention to this case that you will find of interest if your organization is contemplating implementing drug and alcohol testing.See also our earlier post on drug and alcohol testing, called Impairment Testing: Has its time come? featuring presentations by Gabe Somjen of BLG and Dr. Ken Baker.

Written by Michael J WeilerReaders of my blog and newsletters over the years will know I have one constant theme—employers should get enforceable written agreements for all employees and even “contractors”. In that way, the chances of expensive and time-consuming litigation will be in most cases eliminated [I say ‘in most cases’ because as the case of Miller v. Convergys CMG Canada Limited Partnership (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied) demonstrates, even a well-drafted employment agreement can be challenged. But employers continue to avoid the up-front effort of getting written agreements and therefore it is not surprising that there continue to be court cases involving the termination of employees.In a recent case, James v The Hollypark Organization Inc. 2016 BCSC 495, the Supreme Court of British Columbia found that the employer was bound by a fixed-term contract which greatly increased the employee’s damage claim upon termination. What is unique about this case is that the parties did not have a written employment agreement.The Plaintiff Ms. James had been employed in Vernon, B.C. as the general manager of a Marriott hotel. Her experience included both opening and operating a new hotel. Ms. James retired and shortly thereafter the defendant, who had owned a Super 8 motel in Vernon, decided to upgrade their holdings and entered into a contract with Marriott. It then commenced building the new hotel which opened in 2013.In the spring of 2012, the Defendant hired Ms. James to work as general manager of the new hotel and assist in opening. No formal written agreement was signed. Ms. James was terminated on August 26th, 2013. Ms. James alleged she was hired to act as general manager of the hotel on a fixed one-year term contract to operate the new hotel upon opening and claimed damages for that period. She maintained that on the basis of a conversation that took place in August 2012 the parties agreed to this one year term. The Defendant denied a fixed term agreement had been reached and argued her damages were limited to a short period of notice.The Court summarized the law regarding fixed-term contracts as follows:[12] Where termination of employment occurs in the context of a fixed-term contract, the damages assessed will be calculated based on the unexpired portion of the term. The plaintiff will generally be paid the entire balance of the contract, less any deductions for work the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to earn from other employment: Nevin v. British Columbia Hazardous Waste Management Corp. (1995), 129 D.L.R. (4th) 569 at para. 18 (B.C.C.A.).[13] The onus is on the plaintiff to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that her employment contract was for a definite term: Herold v. Marathon Developments Inc./Societe Developpement Marathon Inc., 1999 CarswellBC 863 at para. 6 (WL Can) (S.C.). A fixed-term contract can be created orally: Singh v. The Empire Life Ins. Co., 2002 BCCA 452; see also Ellen E. Mole, Wrongful Dismissal Practice Manual, 2d ed, Vol. 1 (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2014) at §1.64.[14] In determining whether an employment contract was for a fixed term or an ongoing period, Betton J., in Alsip v. Top Rollshutters Inc. doing business as Talius, 2015 BCSC 1166 at para. 40, cited with approval the summary of considerations set out in Canelas v. People First of Canada, 2009 MBQB 67. That summary is helpful and indicates:● A fixed-term contract can be in writing or orally made or partly in writing and partly oral. The term may be fixed to a certain time or certain event. However, to be fixed, the intention of the parties must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied;● The parties must be ad idem as to the term. If only one of the parties inferred the term was fixed, that is insufficient; and● Whether the parties’ agreement was oral or partly written and partly oral – the evidence of the parties’ oral discussions should allow the reasonable observer to conclude the individual at issue was hired for a fixed term.[15] I note Newbury J.A., in De Cotiis v. Viam Holdings Ltd., 2010 BCCA 368 at para. 21, pointed to flexibility in the nature of the evidence to prove the oral contract at issue:[21] … As G.H.L. Fridman notes in The Law of Contracts in Canada (5th ed., 2006) “[i]n the case of a completely oral contract there is greater flexibility in the nature of the evidence that is admissible to prove the contents of the contract and the meaning of the language used by the parties.” (At 440.) This flexibility follows intuitively from the recognition that oral contracts must often be construed without the key interpretive tool used to understand written contracts – the words of the agreement.The Court noted that the contract was an oral one and as such there was little documentary evidence as to the terms of that agreement. It noted “the parties also have very different views of their meetings, conversations and the ultimate terms of the employment agreement.” [para. 17]. The Court reviewed all the evidence including the meetings, conversations and documents. It relied on, among other things, the Franchise Agreement, the Marriott “Opening Your Hotel Timeline”, emails and other related documents. It found that it was unlikely that Marriott would accept someone else who was not as qualified as Ms. James to manage the hotel. The Court held that although some of the evidence was not definitive one way or the other, a consideration of “all of these factors lead to the conclusion the meeting and discussion in August 2012 took place as Ms. James related” and therefore the Court found that “Ms. James had an employment agreement with Hollypark for a fixed term of one year from the date of the Hotel opening.”Damages were assessed based on the one-year fixed term contract and there was no need therefore to determine what reasonable notice might have been in the absence of such an agreement. No reduction was made for a failure to mitigate. She was awarded $53,485.72 as well as 4% vacation pay and special damages of $837.49 related to moving and storage expenses. The parties were left to agree on what costs Ms. James would receive failing which they were at liberty to apply (it may well be that Ms. James made a formal Offer to Settle and would have therefore been entitled to significantly greater costs than normal).LESSONS LEARNEDDespite the onus on Ms. James to prove the actual terms of the contract she was able to point to evidence that supported her version of what was agreed to in August 2012 in that meeting. The defendant then was found liable for over $50,000 plus it must pay a portion of Ms. James’ legal fees and disbursements. Obviously the defendant had to pay its lawyer for preparing and attending a 3-day trial. The defendant also had to suffer the embarrassment of having their evidence rejected in a formal court decision. It also ran the risk of collateral damage to its reputation and relationship with Marriott.And consider what would have been the damages if the employee had proven a much longer fixed-term contract? She was 65 years old so her chances of finding another job would have been very slim and so damages would have been calculated on the balance of the fixed term period. Add in other claims like stock options, pensions, benefits etc and the damage award could be enormous: see for example Hawkes v Levelton.All of those costs and aggravations could have been easily avoided if the employer had simply confirmed in a written contract their version of the terms of the agreement and resolved any disagreement with Ms. James at the outset.I tell my young referees in our officiating clinics “Experience is just how we describe our mistakes” and therefore mistakes are good but only IF we learn from them. Even better is to learn from someone else’s mistake.

Guest post, written by Timothy J NicholsA. INTRODUCTIONThe new BC Societies Act will come into force on November 28, 2016, replacing the current Society Act. The new Act will be more similar to the current legislation for both business companies and not-for-profit corporations in BC and other Canadian jurisdictions. The changes are significant. Most commentators agree that the upgrade is long overdue.The following is a brief summary highlighting some of the impact of the new legislation on the many existing BC societies. There is also a discussion regarding certain steps that should be taken by every society’s principals now and in due course. This memorandum is of a general nature, is not exhaustive, and is not intended to represent legal advice. Please contact Tim Nichols for additional information or consideration of your particular society’s circumstances.B. SUMMARY OF CHANGES

1. With several specific exceptions, the new Act will automatically apply to all existing societies as soon it is proclaimed in force on November 28.

2. Any provision in the current bylaws of an existing society that is inconsistent with the new Act will immediately cease to have an effect on November 28.

3. Some of the most important revisions of the new legislation relating to directors and senior managers of societies. Some of those sections will not apply to existing societies for a grace period of two years after the new Act comes into force. (See for example item 8 below.)

4. There will be a mandatory transition of existing societies under the new Act, which must be effected within two years after November 28, 2016. At a minimum this will entail the entry of certain basic information regarding all existing societies in the new electronic database being instituted by the BC Registrar of Companies. The filing will include the full text of their current constitutions and bylaws. (Reporting societies must also include prescribed provisions in their bylaws in the course of this transition filing. See Part C below.)

5. Under the new Act there will for the first time be a distinction between member-funded societies and other societies. As the phrase suggests, societies that rely to a significant extent on public sources of funding will not be “member-funded”. A society which is a registered charity; or which received the greater of $20,000 or 10% of its gross income over the prior two fiscal years from donations or government funding, will be deemed not to be member-funded. Societies that are not member-funded must disclose certain financial information such as the remuneration of their directors and employees. (An example of a member-funded society would be a private club. Member-funded societies are not required to comply with these new disclosure obligations.)

6. The format of constitutions of societies will change such that they include only the name and purposes of a society (and, if applicable, the fact that the society is member-funded). All other provisions in the constitution must be transferred to the bylaws. This includes provisions of the constitution that were previously unalterable. They will in effect become alterable by virtue of their inclusion in the bylaws.

7. Perhaps the most important amendment of the new Act is the reduction of the threshold for the passage of special resolutions of the members of a society from the current majority of 75% to two-thirds. Special resolutions are required for proposed bylaw amendments such as name changes and other extraordinary matters. An existing society may avoid this fundamental change by amending its bylaws before November 28 to provide for a higher majority threshold for special resolutions than two-thirds. The majority may be determined to be as high as 100% on all or certain matters. (Amendments to bylaws only take effect when filed with the Registrar. If a society wishes to adopt a majority for special resolutions greater than two-thirds before November 28, it should initiate the requisite corporate proceedings right away. The current filing process will continue to apply until it is revamped as described in item 11 below.)

8. The qualifications of directors will be heightened as specified. In addition, directors must consent in writing to their election or appointment. (These are some of the provisions of the new Act whose application is delayed until 2018 as mentioned in item 3 above.)

9. Directors may not be remunerated by a society in that capacity unless the bylaws expressly permit such remuneration. Reimbursement of expenses will continue to be permissible.

10. Fewer than a majority of the directors of a society may receive remuneration as employees or contractors. There will be enhanced procedures and provisions relating to conflicts of interest of directors and management.

11. Most filings required to be made by societies with the Registrar of Companies will be made electronically. For example it will no longer be necessary to make paper filings of certified copies of special resolutions amending the constitution or bylaws. This online filing system has been used for BC companies for several years and is both convenient and efficient. However its adoption means that it will now be more important than ever to maintain a society’s official record book to a meticulous standard.

C. REPORTING SOCIETIES

1. Only approximately 1% of BC societies are reporting societies so this part of this summary will not be of interest to many readers.
2. Pursuant to the regulations under the new Act, a reporting society must include six specific provisions, word for word, in the set of bylaws filed by the society as part of its transition application. These mandatory prescribed bylaws relate to the appointment of auditors and financial reporting.

D. WHAT MUST BE DONE BY EXISTING SOCIETIES?

1. Management should determine whether or not their society is member-funded under the new scheme (as summarized in item B-5 above). If they are not member-funded, management should familiarize themselves with the new related financial reporting obligations.

2. The constitution and bylaws of every existing society should be reviewed in order to determine whether they conflict with the new Act. Any such conflicting provisions will cease to be effective as of November 28. It may, therefore, be necessary to enact related amendments of the constitution or bylaws prior to that date. Any such amendments must be effected the “old-fashioned way” under the current scheme, requiring the passage of special resolutions of the members by a 75% majority followed by paper filings in Victoria. In many cases this may also entail the convening of an extraordinary general meeting of the members of the society.

3. Management should consider adopting new incorporation documents which conform generally to the new Act. It may not be necessary to do so prior to November 28.

4. One of the possible options is to adopt the model bylaws appended to the new Act, perhaps with some customizing. The new model bylaws are fairly basic. They are materially different from the current model bylaws.

5. Management should otherwise plan for mandatory transition under the new Act. Some of the detailed transitional steps and procedures are still in the process of being ironed out and published by the Registry.

E. CONCLUSIONThe above summary should provide any person who is a member, director, officer, manager, contractor or advisor of an existing BC society with some important basic information about the impact of the new legislation. You are encouraged to obtain legal advice with respect to your particular situation. For additional information, please contact Tim Nichols.© Copyright 2016 Timothy J. NicholsPublished with permission of Timothy J. NicholsHUNGERFORD TOMYN LAWRENSON AND NICHOLS LAWYERS1100 Cathedral Place, 925 West Georgia Street, Vancouver, BC V6C 3L2Tel. 604 408 5600 Fax 604 408 5630 email: [email protected]

Written by Michael J WeilerTCF Ventures Corp. v. The Cambie Malone’s Corp. 2016 BCSC 1521Can a corporation bring a “wrongful dismissal “action? The answer is yes.TCF Ventures Corp (“TCF”) sued The Cambie Malone’s Corporation (“Malone’s”) for wrongful dismissal. TCF was the incorporated entity of Tim Fernback who provided a range of financial and commercial services through TCF. In 2009 Mr. Fernback answered a job posting for CFO of Malone’s. He was awarded the job which the court found was not full time but rather Malone’s expected Mr. Fernback to work “in the order of 3 days a week” and that it would be acceptable for Mr. Fernback to have other clients even though he had taken this position at Malone’s. The parties agreed Mr. Fernback could provide his services by way of his personal corporation TCF.In November 2009 Mr. Fernback took on the duties of COO as well and had his income increased from $75,000 to $100,000 per year and he worked full time. In 2012 his COO duties were removed, his compensation reverted to $75,000 but he took on additional duties of raising capital for which he was to be paid a 4 % finder’s fee.Malone’s ended the relationship in November 2012. TCF sued for wrongful dismissal. Malone’s argued, inter alia, that relationship between it and TCF was that of an independent contractor and not an employee or “dependent contractor” and as such TCF was not entitled to any notice.The court found that “the essential nature of the relationship was akin to an employer-employee situation, as opposed to a pure independent contractor” and as such Mr. Fernback/TCF was entitled to reasonable notice of termination.Sometimes I find a case that provides a very useful and succinct summary of the law. TCF v Malone’s is one such case so I will quote at length from the decision with respect to the distinction between an independent contractor and an employee and the intermediate relationship of “dependent contractor”:Nature of the relationship[45] It is necessary to determine the essential character of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.[46] Mr. Fernback provided his services to the defendant by way of his personal corporation; that was an arrangement that was acceptable to both parties. It was done at the behest of Mr. Fernback. It is clear that he had his reasons for doing so—principally, it seems to me, to enable him to achieve significant tax savings. A related factor is Mr. Fernback’s practice to be almost constantly looking for other job opportunities and situations. The evidence disclosed a nearly incessant sending of resumes and expressions of interest for a wide range of positions. While that might have been, for some employers, a matter of concern or dissatisfaction, it was not an issue for Mr. Yehia (although I do not believe he was fully aware of the extent of Mr. Fernback’s endeavours on that front). He knew from the outset that Mr. Fernback wished to have the latitude of pursuing additional or supplementary business as circumstances allowed, and he did not object, presumably so long as those activities did not interfere with Mr. Fernback’s ability to fulfil his obligation to CMC. Indeed, the initial agreement contemplated that Mr. Fernback would work only on a part-time basis for CMC.[47] There were material differences between the format that these parties had and what one might characterize as a purely conventional, traditional arrangement whereby a worker is hired as an employee. In that type of structure, the individual is on the company payroll and generally receives paychecks each pay period where the statutory deductions are made by the employer and remitted to the relevant authority, in addition to a host of other earmarks of a typical salaried employee.[48] The jurisprudence of employment law has, in relatively recent times, evolved to recognize the realities of the modern workplace and the fact that the relationship between workers and those to whom they provide their services is not simply binary—either employee-employer or independent contractor. In a number of decisions, the courts have come to acknowledge that there are a variety of different arrangements that the parties may have. The approach to be taken is to examine the situation from a functional perspective.[49] The result has been the recognition of relationships that fall within an area between the two traditional models. Dealing with a similar issue in Kahn v. All-Can Express Ltd., 2014 BCSC 1429, I made the following comments, which I feel are pertinent to the matter at hand:[21] … Based upon a number of authorities to which I have been referred, I am satisfied that the common law with respect to this issue has evolved into a more nuanced state, one that reflects the reality of an economy where many workers perform services for others in arrangements that are specifically structured such that they are neither employer-employee relationships nor are they properly characterizable as independent contractor relationships.[22] In effect, the courts have recognized that these sorts of relationships, depending upon their particular features, can fall at different points along a continuum, ranging from pure employer-employee situations to classic independent contractor arrangements: Hillis Oil and Sales Ltd. v. Wynn’s Canada, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 57; Stewart v. Knoll North America Corp., 2007 BCCA 11; and Movassaghi v. Steels Industrial Products Ltd., 2012 BCSC 1663.[23] In that analytic framework, there is a recognition of what is sometimes labelled a dependent contractor status. It is neither of the traditional positions, but rather has some features of each.[24] … In Mancino, Mr. Justice Lederman stated the following at paras. 9-10:Although the plaintiff in fact ran his own business, an examination of the relationship between the parties shows that there was a dependency that was mutual and permanent in nature….There is no doubt that the plaintiff, to use the words in the Labour Relations Act, was in “a position of economic dependence” upon the defendant which “more closely [resembled] the relationship of an employee than that of an independent contractor”. The fact of dependency continued even after the plaintiff’s change of status from a “dependent contractor” to a broker. In either capacity the plaintiff’s arrangement had all the hallmarks of an employment relationship with the defendant. This relationship was of a permanent and exclusive nature implicit in which was the understanding that it would be terminated only on the giving of reasonable notice. [Citation omitted.][50] In Marbry Distributors Ltd. v. Avrecan Int. Inc., 1999 BCCA 172, at para. 38, Braidwood J.A. provided the following non-exhaustive list of factors for determining where on the continuum a relationship falls, noting that not one is by itself conclusive nor necessary to determine the type of relationship as one requiring notice:[38] … Those factors are:[1] Duration/Permanency of the Relationship. The longer the duration of the relationship or the more permanent it is, militates in favour of a reasonable notice requirement. Amongst other evidence, the purchase and maintenance of inventory, which contains a permanency aspect, should be considered;[2] Degree of Reliance/Closeness of the Relationship. As these two interrelated sub-factors are increased the more likely it is that the relationship falls on the employer/employee side of the continuum. Included in this factor is whether the sale of the defendant’s products amounted to a significant percentage of the plaintiff’s revenues; and[3] Degree of Exclusivity. An exclusive relationship favours the master/servant classification.[51] Notwithstanding the formal structure (that is, the provision of services through a corporation) and the lack of complete exclusivity, it is my conclusion based on all of the above that the arrangement the parties agreed upon in this case entailed a significant element of personal service. CMC set out to hire a CFO; it wanted a professional person to provide certain services to the corporation. That entailed having a specific, identified, and qualified person to perform those functions. The person CMC selected was Mr. Fernback. It was his package of attributes that CMC wanted to have working for it, and that is what occurred.[52] By way of analogy, this was not a situation where CMC entered into a contract with a third-party corporate entity—say, for example, one of the major accounting firms—to have that firm assign a properly qualified worker to provide the services required. CMC bargained to have Mr. Fernback join its workforce, and that is what happened. There was a permanency to that relationship that persisted for a significant time—some three and a half years.[53] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the essential nature of the relationship was akin to an employer-employee situation, as opposed to a pure independent contractor.[54] My view is that Mr. Fernback was “employed” by CMC between April 1, 2009, and November 2012. Over that span of time, his responsibilities and rate of remuneration changed from time to time. Initially, he was the CFO at $75,000 per year; he subsequently took on the dual COO/CFO role at a rate of $100,000 per year. Finally, in March 2012, he reverted to the CFO job description at a rate of $75,000 per year. That was augmented by the fundraising assignment that he took on.[55] The actual end of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is somewhat shrouded in confusion. Some insight into that is to be found in an email exchange between Mr. Fernback and Mr. Yehia at the end of October.[56] My conclusion is that Mr. Fernback was effectively terminated on November 15, 2012. That date is somewhat arbitrary, as Mr. Yehia and Mr. Fernback carried on their discussion regarding the matter over a period of time. However, it seems to me that, by then, the parties knew that the relationship that had subsisted to then, albeit in somewhat shifting forms, was over. Notwithstanding that, Mr. Fernback appears to have continued to pursue his activities to raise capital for the defendant for a period of time. In fact, the plaintiff subsequently rendered an invoice to the defendant with respect to the commissions related to those funds. I made mention of that invoice earlier.[57] In the result, I find that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was such as to entitle the plaintiff to notice at common law. The termination was without cause. It is my view that, at the point of termination, that is, on November 15, 2012, the rate of remuneration upon which any damages in lieu of notice would be based would be comprised of two components: (a) an annual salary of $75,000 per year, and (b) the commission earned at a rate of 4% with respect to funds generated for the business enterprises of CMC under the Finder’s Fee Contract.The court found that Mr. Fernback through TCF was entitled to gross damages of $131,000 based on 9 months’ notice less $23,000 he earned from another contract.LESSONS LEARNEDMore and more courts are finding that employees who operate through their companies are in fact and law either “employees” or “dependent contractors” and as such are entitled to reasonable notice of termination absent just cause. In this case the notice period of 9 months is certainly in line with the notice period for an employee so there is little reduction for the fact that the Plaintiff here was a corporation.Readers who follow my blog will know what I say the answer is —to avoid litigation, get a formal written, enforceable contract that spells out clearly the nature of the relationship and the amount of notice required to terminate that relationship absent “cause”. The court, in this case, would appear to agree with my philosophy as evidenced by these closing remarks:[82] By way of a final observation, it seems to me that this dispute and this lawsuit are a regrettable outcome of experienced and ostensibly competent businessmen entering into important arrangements without documenting the terms they expect to apply to that relationship. When differences arise, as not-infrequently occurs, litigation, with all the attendant uncertainties and risks, often results. Ultimately, that is to the benefit of no one.